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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to deal with dishon-
est opinions in recommendation-based trust models, at both the collec-
tion and processing levels. We consider a scenario in which an agent
requests recommendations from multiple parties to build trust toward
another agent. At the collection level, we propose to allow agents to self-
assess the accuracy of their recommendations and autonomously decide
on whether they would participate in the recommendation process or
not. At the processing level, we propose a recommendations aggregation
technique that is resilient to collusion attacks, followed by a credibility
update mechanism for the participating agents. The originality of our
work stems from its consideration of dishonest opinions at both the col-
lection and processing levels, which allows for better and more persistent
protection against dishonest recommenders. Experiments conducted on
the Epinions dataset show that our solution yields better performance
in protecting the recommendation process against Sybil attacks, in com-
parison with a competing model that derives the optimal network of
advisors based on the agents’ trust values.
Keywords: Recommendation system · trust model · Sybil attacks ·Ma-
chine learning.
1 Introduction
Collecting recommendations is an important step of any trust establishment
process. It involves consulting a set of agents (often referred to as advisors) re-
garding the behavior of other agents. Therefore, ensuring the authenticity of the
collected recommendations is essential to the success of trust modeling. Thus, it
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is of prime importance to reason about whose opinions to elicit when collecting
recommendations and under what circumstances [8]. This can be done either at
the collection level by pre-filtering the set of agents to whom recommendation
requests should be sent or at the processing level by deciding (out of the col-
lected recommendations) whose opinions to keep and whose opinions to discard
or discount. The goal of this work is to come up with a reasoning model that
helps trust modelers ensure the authenticity of recommendations at both the
collection and processing levels. We argue first that pre-filtering agents at the
collection level is quite hard especially in large-scale dynamic settings. In fact,
with the growing number of deployed agents (e.g., smart vehicles, robots, etc.),
it is becoming quite hard to design a filtering algorithm that can efficiently cover
all the existing agents. In addition, the behavior of the agents is often subject to
change (i.e., being honest sometimes and dishonest some other times) especially
in the presence of smart malicious agents that seek to avoid being detected and
punished. Therefore, we chose, in the first part of our solution, to allow agents to
self-decide on whether to participate in the recommendation process or not. The
decision of the agents is mainly affected by two factors. The first is the amount
of resources they can allocate towards trust modeling. For instance, in some
applications such as intelligent transportation systems, autonomous cars might
prefer to fully dedicate their resources to making real-time driving decisions.
The second factor is the accuracy level that agents believe their recommenda-
tions have. At this stage, we argue that only honest agents are expected to
follow this self-withdrawal principle to both help the decision-making process
and maintain their own credibility. On the other hand, dishonest agents are of-
ten encouraged to still participate by giving untruthful opinions to manipulate
the recommendation decisions. Therefore, further reasoning is needed at the pre-
cessing/aggregation level to discard such dishonest opinions. The challenge here
is to design an aggregation solution that is resilient to dishonest agents even
when such agents form the majority. This is because dishonest agents might
take advantage of the self-withdrawal of honest agents to impose their opinions
by majority. Worse, dishonest agents might launch some attacks (e.g., Sybil,
whitewashing, camouflage, etc.) to further increase their chances of swaying the
recommendation decisions.
1.1 Contributions
Our solution is composed of four principal phases: recommendation collection,
aggregation to discourage dishonesty, credibility update, and participation mo-
tivation. In the first phase, agents are asked by the underlying recommender
system to run the decision tree machine learning technique on their datasets
to derive appropriate recommendations. Specifying the machine learning tech-
nique to be used is essential in our solution to guarantee the homogeneity in
terms of opinions origins. Leaving this decision for the agents might lead to in-
consistent decisions that are biased towards some machine learning algorithms,
dataset size, number of dimensions in the dataset, etc. Our choice of decision tree
stems from its lightweight nature which makes it suitable for situations wherein
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resource-constrained agents exist. Interested agents (e.g., those that have enough
resources) train the decision tree algorithm on their datasets which record their
previous interactions with agents of different specifications and behavior and
decide, based on the obtained accuracy level, on whether to submit their opin-
ions or not. Our decisions for this collection phase provide important insights
into two of the stages of trust modeling highlighted by Sen [8]. The Engage step
(who to ask) is moderated by agents having the choice of opting out. The Use
step (taking actions based on trust modeling) is also facilitated, as the common
reasoning that we require yields insights into the origins of the reputation values
provided.
In the second phase, the opinions from different agents are aggregated by
the underlying recommender system using the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST)
of evidence [9] to arrive at final aggregate initial trust scores. The aggregation
technique takes into consideration the collusion attacks (i.e., Sybil, camouflage,
and whitewashing) that might occur among agents to give dishonest recommen-
dations with the purpose of promoting/demoting some agents and accounts for
the special case where dishonest agents are the majority. In the credibility update
phase, we propose a mechanism to update the credibility scores of the agents
that participate in the recommendation collection phase and ensure the authen-
ticity of the recommendation process [10, 12, 13]. Finally, in the participation
motivation phase, we argue that in settings where agents may be both requesters
and providers of information (such as service-oriented environments) agents will
be particularly motivated to assist when recommendations are requested. We
discuss this component of our model in greater detail, later in the paper.
2 Related Work
In [1], the authors assume that users have a network of trusted peers and combine
the opinions of these advisors, averaging their ratings on commonly rated items.
Trust and social similarity are merged to represent the active user’s preferences
and generate appropriate recommendations, for the case when little is known
about the user. In [4], the authors employ collaborative filtering to ease the
recommendation process using a two-stage methodology. In the first stage, users
are represented in the form of a social network graph and the task is to collect
trust statements regarding newcomer users. In the second stage, all the trust
statements are analyzed and aggregated using the averaging technique to predict
the trust scores of the newcomer users. In [3], the authors propose a three-phase
approach to address the problem of cold-start users. In the first phase, the C4.5
and Naive Bayes techniques are employed to assign new users to specific groups.
In the second phase, an algorithm is proposed to explore the neighbors of the new
user and an equation is presented to compute the similarity between new users
and their neighbors in terms of characteristics. In the final phase, a prediction
method is used to estimate the final rating of the new user for every existing
item, where the rating is a weighted sum of ratings submitted by the user’s
neighbors on the corresponding item. In [5], local information obtained through
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analyzing users’ past ratings is used to assign initial trust values for ubiquitous
devices (e.g. smart vehicles). More specifically, this approach uses Singular Value
Decomposition, which represents known trust values as linear combinations of
numeric features and then combines them to estimate the unknown trust value.
The primary contrast with the aforementioned models can be outlined in
three main points. First, the discussed approaches deal with dishonest recom-
mendations at either the collection or processing level. Our solution operates on
both levels to increase the protection against dishonest recommendations. Sec-
ond, in the approaches that operate at the collection level, the choice of evaluat-
ing the adequacy of the agents in participating in the recommendation process is
left only to the recommender system through computing the optimal network of
agents that maximize trust, without accounting for the self-willingness and self-
confidence of the agents themselves. In other words, although some agents might
be highly trusted in general, this does not mean that they will be providing ac-
curate recommendations for all types of requests. The accuracy here might vary
according to the data available to these agents, the characteristics of the agents
being recommended, and the technique used to compute recommendations. To
tackle this challenge, we leave in this work the choice for the agents to self-
asses their own ability in participating in the recommendation process or not.
In addition, we force the agents to use a common recommendation computation
technique (i.e., decision tree) to increase the homogeneity of the received rec-
ommendations. Third, different from the literature which employs aggregation
techniques that might be vulnerable to manipulation, we take advantage of DST
to perform the aggregation in a manner that is sensitive to possible dishonesty
even in extreme cases wherein dishonest agents might be the majority.
3 Proposed Solution
3.1 Solution Overview
The proposed solution can be summarized as follows. Each agent maintains
a dataset which corroborates its previous interactions with agents of different
specifications and behavior. This dataset is assumed to be labelled in the sense
that the agent would classify each interaction as being either trustworthy or
untrustworthy based on the degree of its satisfaction on the behavior of the
agents involved in the interaction. Upon the receipt of a recommendation re-
quest from recommender system r regarding agent ai, agent aj has the choice
to decide on whether to participate in the recommendation process or not. If
aj accepts to participate, it will train the decision tree classifier on its dataset
to predict the trustworthiness of ai based on the potential similarities between
the specifications of ai and those of the agents that aj has previously dealt
with (i.e., content-based recommendation). Based on the results of the machine
learning classifier, agent aj recommends agent ai as being either trustworthy
or untrustworthy. To avoid biased recommendations, the recommender system
collects recommendations from multiple agents and aggregates them using DST
to come up with a final aggregate decision that is resilient to dishonesty. Since
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the performance of DST is greatly dependent on the credibility of the parties
giving the judgements, the third step involves updating the credibility scores
of the participating agents on the basis of the convergence/divergence of their
opinions w.r.t the final judgement given by DST. The proposed recommendation
system is depicted in Algorithm 1 (executed by the recommender system).
Algorithm 1: Recommendation Algorithm
1: Input: agent ai subject to recommendation
2: Input: Set A of agents eligible to participate in the recommendation process
3: Output: Recommendation decision R(r, ai) of recommender system r on agent ai
4: procedure Recommendation
5: Broadcast the recommendation request to the set A of agents
6: for each agent a ∈ A do
7: Agent a trains the decision tree classifier
8: Agent a derives the recommendation on agent ai using decision tree
9: end for
10: Use Eq. (1) to compute the belief in ai’s trustworthiness θ
ai
r (T )
11: Use Eq. (2) to compute belief in ai’s untrustworthiness θ
ai
r (N)
12: if θair (T ) > θ
ai
r (N) then
13: R(r, ai)=trustworthy
14: else
15: R(r, ai)=untrustworthy
16: end if
17: Update the credibility score of each agent a ∈ A using Eq. (5)
18: end procedure
3.2 Recommendation Collection
When an agent receives a recommendation request, it has the choice to either
participate in the process or not. This voluntary aspect of participation is a build-
ing block in our solution to ensure fairness for both advisors and agents subject
to recommendation. For example, some agents might not be willing to spend
some time and resources helping other agents make choices. Moreover, some
agents might not have sufficient accuracy (determined by the machine learning
technique), lacking any similarity between the specifications of the agents dealt
with and those of the agent being recommended. Therefore, refraining from
participating would be the best choice for such agents instead of giving inac-
curate recommendations (thanks to the credibility update mechanism proposed
in Section 3.4). In case agents agree to participate, they first use the decision
tree technique to predict the behavior of the underlying agents and derive the
appropriate recommendations. Note that decision tree has been chosen for the
considered problem due to its lightweight nature which requires no heavy com-
putations nor long training time. This is important to (1) incentivize agents to
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participate in the recommendation collection process since they would not be
required to use significant amounts of their resources (e.g., battery) to derive
recommendations, and (2) minimize the time required to collect recommenda-
tions especially when it comes to urgent recommendation requests which require
prompt answers.
3.3 Aggregation to discourage dishonesty
The purpose of this phase is to aggregate the different recommendations collected
as per the previous phase in a non-collusive manner, i.e., in such a way that is
resilient to agents that submit misleading recommendations to promote/demote
some other agents. To do so, DST, which is known for its power in combining
observations coming from multiple sources having different levels of credibilities,
is employed. It is true that DST has been used in many proposals for trust estab-
lishment purposes [14, 15]; however, the main difference between our recommen-
dations aggregation mechanism and the existing DST-based trust establishment
techniques is that our solution requires no predefined thresholds to make a final
decision on whether the agent should be trusted or not. Specifically, contrary
to the existing approaches whose performance is greatly dependent on a certain
threshold, we propose to compute both the belief in an agent’s trustworthiness
and untrustworthiness and comparing them to arrive at a final decision. More-
over, we propose in this work to weigh each witness (recommendation) based
on the credibility score of its issuer, to reflect the dynamism of recommenders’
honesty.
Formally, let Ω = {T,N,U} be a set composed of three hypotheses repre-
senting the possible recommendations on a certain agent, where T means trust-
worthy, N means untrustworthy, and U means uncertainty between trust and
distrust. The basic probability assignment (bpa) maib (H) of a particular hypoth-
esis H given by agent b on agent ai is proportional to the credibility score of b.
Specifically, if agent b having a credibility score of λ has recommended agent ai
as being trustworthy, then the bpa’s of the different hypotheses are computed
as follows: mib(T ) = λ, m
ai
b (N) = 0, and m
ai
b (U) = 1− λ. Otherwise, if b recom-
mends i as being untrustworthy, then the bpa’s of the hypotheses are computed
as follows: maib (T ) = 0, m
ai
b (N) = λ, and m
ai
b (U) = 1 − λ. Having defined
the bpa’s, the final aggregate belief function regarding a certain hypothesis H
is computed through summing up all the bpa’s coming from different recom-
menders upholding this hypothesis H. The belief function that recommender
system r computes regarding agent ai’s trustworthiness after having consulted
two recommenders b and b′ is given in Eq. (1).
θair (T ) = m
ai
b (T )⊕maib′ (T ) =
1
K
[maib (T )m
ai
b′ (T ) +m
ai
b (T )m
ai
b′ (U) +m
ai
b (U)m
ai
b′ (T )]
(1)
Similarly, the belief function computed by r regarding agent ai’s untrustwor-
thiness after having consulted two recommenders b and b′ is given in Eq. (2).
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θair (N) = m
ai
b (N)⊕maib′ (N) =
1
K
[maib (N)m
ai
b′ (N) +m
ai
b (N)m
ai
b′ (U) +m
ai
b (U)m
ai
b′ (N)]
(2)
Finally, the belief function computed by r regarding agent ai being either trust-
worthy or untrustworthy (i.e., uncertainty) after having consulted two recom-
menders b and b′ is given in Eq. (3).
θair (U) = m
ai
b (U)⊕maib′ (U) =
1
K
[maib (U)m
ai
b′ (U)],where: (3)
K =
∑
h∩h′=∅
maib (h)m
ai
b′ (h
′) (4)
Note that the values produced by the different belief functions are real-valued
numbers between 0 and 1, i.e., θair (T ), θ
ai
r (N), θ
ai
r (U) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, the deci-
sion of the recommender system regarding a certain agent ai is taken by comput-
ing the beliefs in ai’s trustworthiness θ
ai
r (T ) and untrustworthiness θ
ai
r (N) and
comparing them, i,e., if θair (T ) > θ
ai
r (N), i is deemed trustworthy; otherwise, ai
is considered as being untrustworthy.
3.4 Credibility Update Mechanism
The credibility scores of the participating agents need to be constantly updated
in order to maintain the authenticity of the recommendation process. That is,
honest recommenders should get their credibility values increased and dishonest
recommenders should undergo a decrease in their credibility values. We propose
in Eq. (5) a credibility update mechanism using which the recommender system
r updates its credibility belief φ(r → a) toward every agent a that has submitted
a recommendation on another agent ai upon the request of r.
φ(r → a) =
{
min (1, φ(r → a) +X), if C 1
|φ(r → a)− Y |, if C 2 (5)
where X = max (θair (T ), θ
ai
r (N)), Y = min (θ
ai
r (T ), θ
ai
r (N)), and C 1 and C 2
are two conditions such that:
C 1 R(a, ai) ∈ {T}&θair (T ) > θair (N) or R(a, ai) ∈ {N}&θair (T ) < θair (M)
C 2 R(a, ai) ∈ {T}&θair (T ) < θair (N) or R(a, ai) ∈ {N}&θair (T ) > θair (N)
The main idea of Eq. (5) is to update the credibility score of each recom-
mender agent a proportionally to the difference between her submitted recom-
mendation R(a, ai) on agent ai and the final decision yielded by the DST-based
aggregation mechanism. In this way, the agents whose recommendations con-
verge to the final decision of the recommender system receive an increase in
their credibility scores and those whose recommendations are far from the final
decision undergo a decrease in their credibility scores. This process is of prime
importance to guarantee the honesty of the recommendation process since the
performance of the DST aggregation technique is highly dependent on the cred-
ibility scores of the recommenders.
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3.5 Incentive Mechanism and Participation Motivation
In order to motivate the agents to participate in the recommendation process, we
propose in this section an incentive mechanism which links the participation of
the agents with the number of inquiries that they are allowed to make. Initially,
all agents have an equal amount of inquiries that they are allowed to make
from any other agent. This amount is then updated during the recommendation
process as shown in Eq. (6). Specifically, every certain period of time, the number
of inquiries that an agent x is allowed to make from any other agent s get
increased in terms of the number of inquiries coming from s that x has answered,
as well as the credibility score of x believed by s, i.e.,
Inq(x→ s) = Inq(x→ s) + (|E(x→ s)|+ d|E(x→ s)| × Cr(s→ x)e+ 1) (6)
In Eq. (6), Inq(x → s) denotes the total number of inquiry requests that x
is allowed to make from s, |E(x→ s)| denotes the number of recommendations
that x has answered in favor of s, and Cr(s→ x) denotes the credibility score of
agent x believed by agent s. In this way, the agents that refuse to participate in
the recommendation process would, over time, end up being unable to make any
request from any other agent. In addition, by linking the number of inquiries
with the credibility score of the recommender agent, we aim at motivating those
agents to provide honest opinions.
4 Experimental Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup and Datasets
We compare our solution with the MET recommendation-based trust model pro-
posed in [2]. The objective of MET is to derive the optimal trust network that
provides the most accurate estimation of sellers’ reputation scores in duopoly
environments. To carry out these experiments, we consider a similar environ-
ment to that considered in [2] by simulating three types of attacks that can
be launched by consulted agents (i.e, advisors) to mislead the recommendation-
based trust establishment process (i.e., Sybil, camouflage, and whitewashing)
and setting the percentage of attackers to 30% of the total number of advisors.
We compare both approaches in terms of Mean Absolute Error (MAE), which is
computed as follows: MAE(i) = |Trust(i)−
ˆTrust(i)|
|A| , where Trust(i) is the actual
trust score of item i, ˆTrust(i) is the trust value of item i estimated by the trust
model, and | A | is the number of consulted agents. In Sybil attacks, dishonest
agents generate several fake identities in an attempt to manipulate the trust ag-
gregation process by submitting a large number of dishonest recommendations.
In camouflage attacks, attackers try to fool the trust system by providing honest
recommendations in the beginning to build good credibility scores and then start
to submit dishonest recommendations. In whitewashing, dishonest agents try to
clear their bad credibility history through continuously creating new identities.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
To conduct the experiments, real-world trust data from the Epinions6 large
Web community are employed. Epinions allows users to express their opinions
regarding a wide variety of items (e.g., movies, cars, etc.) in the form of numeric
ratings from the interval [1, 5], with 1 being the rating which represents the least
satisfaction level and 5 being the rating which represents a full satisfaction level.
Epinions allows users as well to rate each other on the basis of the meaningfulness
of their submitted ratings. The dataset consists of approximately 140, 000 items
rated by 50, 000 users, where a total of ≈ 660, 000 reviews are collected [4].
We chose to use Epinions when comparing with other approaches thanks to
its large-scale nature, which allows us to better test the generalizability of the
studied solutions. The machine learning classifier has been trained on the dataset
following the k-fold cross-validation approach (with k = 10) [6]. Note finally
that the experiments have been conducted using Matlab in a 64-bit Windows 7
environment on a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU 3.60 GHz
Processor and 16 GB RAM.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Table 1: Mean Absolute Error (MAE) comparison of items’ initial trust estimation
between our solution and MET [2]
Our Solution MET
Sybil 0.05± 0.02 0.09± 0.06
Camouflage 0.12± 0.01 0.01± 0.00
Whitewashing 0.06± 0.03 0.05± 0.03
We notice from Table 1 that our solution decreases the MAE compared to
MET in the presence of Sybil attacks. In fact, MET is based on the idea of gener-
ating various networks of advisors with different trust values using evolutionary
operators and then keeping the best network that consists of advisors having
the highest trust values. However, even in the optimal network of advisors, there
is still some chances of encountering a minority of advisors that might provide
inaccurate recommendations. Worse, in the case of Sybil attacks, such a minor-
ity might even become a majority by creating a large number of fake identities.
In such cases, MET provides no countermeasures against such advisors. On the
other hand, our solution operates not only at the collection level but also at the
recommendation aggregation level, thus providing an additional countermeasure
against dishonesty. Specifically, in our approach, we broadcast the recommenda-
tion requests to the set of available advisors and allow these advisors to self-assess
their degrees of accuracy prior to submitting their recommendations. Thereafter,
we aggregate the recommendations coming from advisors having different levels
6 http://www.epinions.com/
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of credibility using the Dempster-Shafer method, which is mainly influenced by
the credibility of the agents, rather than their number. This makes our solution
quite resilient to Sybil attacks and efficient even in scenarios in which dishonest
advisors might form the majority [11].
On the other hand, in camouflage attacks, MET entails lower MAE com-
pared to our solution. The reason is that in such a type of attacks, dishonest
advisors initially provide honest recommendations to build up good credibil-
ity scores, prior to starting their dishonest recommendations. This makes our
recommendation-based trust aggregation method, which is mainly influenced by
the credibility scores of the advisors, to be vulnerable to such attackers for a
short period of time (i.e., the period at which dishonest advisors switch their
behavior and start providing misleading recommendations). When it comes to
whitewashing attacks, our solution and MET show relatively similar resilience
to such attacks. In fact, MET keeps only the network of advisors with the most
suitable trust values according to some evolutionary operators, which makes it
hard for whitewashing agents to get into these networks. In our solution, even
though some dishonest agents might clear their bad credibility history and rejoin
the network again, such newcomer agents aren’t expected to have high credibility
values as compared to those honest agents who have strived to build and retain
high credibility scores. Consequently, the presence of camouflage attackers does
not have a significant impact on the performance of our solution.
(a) Sybil (b) Camouflage
  
(c) Whitewashing
Fig. 1: The effects of Sybil, camouflage, and whitewashing attacks on the MAE
entailed by our solution
In Fig. 1, we study in more detail the effects of each of the three types of at-
tacks on our solution. We can notice from Fig. 1a that Sybil attacks have no effect
on our solution, for the reasons mentioned above. From Fig. 1b, we can see that
up to the fifth iteration (the period during which camouflage attackers provide
honest recommendations to gain high credibility scores), the MAE entailed by
our solution is low. At the fifth iteration (the time moment at which camouflage
attackers start to change their behavior by providing dishonest recommenda-
tions), the MAE of our solution is reported to be relatively high (i.e., 0.18).
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Starting from the sixth iteration, our solution starts to recognize the camouflage
attackers and decrease their credibility, thus leading to gradually improving the
performance and decreasing the MAE. Finally, from 1c, we notice that white-
washing attacks have a small effect on the performance of our solution for the
reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Ensuring the honesty of recommendations is a building block for the success of
any recommendation-based trust model. We proposed in this paper a mechanism
to deal with dishonest recommendations at both the collection and processing
levels. Experimental results on a real-life dataset revealed that our solution con-
siderably increases the accuracy of recommendations in the presence of Sybil
attackers. Our solution shows also significant resilience to whitewashing and
camouflage attacks.
Three issues are important to continue to consider for future work. The first
is that of identity management, which is important to verify the identities of the
recommenders and prevent identity impersonation and/or duplication. To ad-
dress this issue, we plan to integrate blockchain-based solutions such as uport7
into our solution. Another issue is addressing cases where peers have subjective
differences. In the future, we plan to extend our solution to support situations
wherein users might use different evaluation functions, thus learning these func-
tions in a manner similar to that of the BLADE system [7]. A final concern is
to continue to incentivize peers to provide recommendations. This is an ongoing
concern for recommender systems, especially in crowdsourced environments.
7 https://www.uport.me/
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